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Abstract 
This paper addresses transit technology investment issues under urban population volatility 
using a real option approach. Two important problems are investigated: which transit 
technology should be selected and when should it be introduced. A real option model is 
proposed to incorporate explicitly the effects of transit technology investment on urban spatial 
structure in terms of households’ residential location choices and housing market. The trigger 
population thresholds for investing in a transit technology project and for shifting from a 
transit technology to another are explored analytically. Comparative static analyses of the 
urban system and transit technology investment are also carried out. It was found that (i) 
transit technology investment can induce urban sprawl; (ii) ignoring the effects of transit 
technology investment on urban spatial equilibrium can lead to a late investment; and (iii) 
there is a significant difference in the trigger population thresholds for transit technology shift 
estimated by the net present value approach and the real option approach. 
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1. Introduction 
 
To respond to growing traffic congestion problems, the Chinese government has launched a 
number of public transportation infrastructure investment projects in recent years. These 
projects include constructing metro, light rapid transit (LRT), and bus rapid transit (BRT) 
lines. For instance, a recent statistical report by Liu et al. (2015) showed that by the end of 
2014, 83 metro lines with a total length of over 2500 km had been constructed in 22 
metropolitan cities in mainland China, and seven cities had built LRT systems with a total 
length of over 300 km. The China BRT database (2014) showed that so far, 19 cities in 
mainland China had already introduced BRT systems with a total length of about 1500 km. 
 
These mass public transportation modes can accommodate a large number of passengers, but 
require huge investment costs. For example, the capital cost of the Shanghai Metro Line 2 
was about RMB600 million per kilometer (RMB is the Chinese currency “Renminbi”. US$1 
approximates RMB6.2 as of January 1, 2015) and the Guangzhou BRT Line located on 
Zhongshan Road cost about RMB50 million per kilometer. Each type of transit technologies 
has its advantages and disadvantages. For instance, a metro system can carry more passengers 
at a faster operating speed, but needs higher capital and operating costs than a bus service. 
BRT is regarded as a high-quality, cost-effective bus-based transit mode. BRT systems use 
buses to provide faster and more efficient services than an ordinary bus line. These systems 
combine the speed, reliability, and amenities of rail transit with the flexibility of bus transit. 
The investment cost of a BRT system is much lower than that of a metro system with the 
same length. However, the speed and capacity of a BRT system are low, making it difficult to 
satisfy a high level of passenger demand, particularly in densely populated urban areas. LRT 
systems are above-ground rail transit systems. They have lower speed and capacity than 
metros but higher than BRT systems. Their capital cost is between that of a metro and of a 
BRT system. The trade-off between the operating speed and capacity and the investment cost 
poses an important question. Which transit technology should an authority introduce so as to 
improve the efficiency of urban transportation system? 
 
In addition, the feasibility of a transit investment project depends heavily on the urban 
population size, which directly governs the level of passenger demand for transit services. 
However, the future population size for a city is uncertain. In particular, with the rapid 
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urbanization, a large amount of rural inhabitants in China migrate to urban areas, leading to a 
large-scale migrant population. It has been reported that China is currently experiencing the 
largest population migration in the human history, causing a big variation in the urban 
population size. An investment made too early may cause a low level of travel demand due to 
a small population size and thus revenue shortfalls and low efficiency, whereas an investment 
made too late may result in large social costs (such as increasing congestion and pollution) 
due to leaving demand unmet for too long. This raises another intriguing and important 
question. When is the most appropriate time for an authority to introduce a new transit 
technology in a fast-growing city with future population volatility? 
 
In the literature, there are some studies on the transit technology selection and investment 
timing problems. For instance, several studies have compared the costs or operating 
efficiencies of selecting different transit technologies, including metro, LRT, and BRT 
systems (e.g., see Allport, 1981; Stutsman, 2002; Bruun, 2005; Tirachini et al., 2010a). 
Parajuli and Wirasinghe (2001) developed a multi-attribute decision model to address the 
transit technology selection problem based on a field survey and an empirical statistical 
approach. Tirachini et al. (2010b) presented a social welfare and a private profit maximization 
model to compare the investment benefits of different transit technologies on a linear 
transportation corridor. Chen et al. (2015) proposed a static (i.e., steady-state), deterministic 
model to address the transit technology selection problem. In their model, travel demand was 
assumed to be time-independent and deterministic. Szymanski (1991) compared the timing of 
infrastructure investment made by a welfare-maximizing public agency and a 
profit-maximizing private firm. Chu and Polzin (2000) studied the timing rules for major 
transportation investment using a cost-benefit analysis model. Sivakumaran et al. (2014) 
explored how the access mode (e.g., walking, bicycle, or feeder bus) affected the choice of 
transit technology (e.g., heavy rail, BRT, or ordinary bus) for the trunk-line portion of a transit 
network. 
 
The above-mentioned studies on transit technology investment issues mainly focused on static 
and deterministic problems. However, the future urban population size and thus the travel 
demand will stochastically and dynamically fluctuate over time (Saez et al., 2012). This is 
particularly true for some of the fast-growing cities in China, which have uncertain future 
population sizes due to large-scale population migration. The return or benefit of a transit 
technology investment project will therefore also change stochastically and dynamically over 
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time. It is therefore necessary to incorporate the dynamics and uncertainty of urban population 
size over time into transit technology investment models. 
 
These previous related studies have usually used the standard benefit-cost analysis method of 
net present value (NPV) (Snell, 2011). It has been shown that the traditional NPV approach 
cannot properly capture management’s flexibility to postpone, abandon, or expand an 
investment opportunity, particularly in an irreversible and uncertain investment environment 
(Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Zhao and Tseng, 2003). The real option (RO) valuation approach 
provides a useful way to capture the value of the flexibility that goes unrecognized in an NPV 
analysis (McDonald and Siegel, 1986; Trigeorgis, 1996; de Neufville and Scholtes, 2011).  
 
In the past decade, RO theory has attracted considerable attention from transportation 
researchers. For the convenience of readers, we have summarized in Table 1 some principal 
contributions of the RO theory to transportation infrastructure investment issues, in terms of 
the type of transportation infrastructure, decision variables, objective function, investment 
effects on land use or spatial structure, model solution, and source of uncertainty. This table 
shows that the previous related studies have mainly focused on the timing issue of transit 
technology investment, and little attention has been paid to the selection issue of transit 
technologies. In addition, they usually ignored the effects of transportation infrastructure 
investment on the urban spatial structure. However, McDonald and Osuji (1995), Bowes and 
Ihlanfeldt (2001), and Li et al. (2012a, 2013) showed that introducing a new transit line could 
induce a change in the urban land-use pattern, property values, and housing market in terms 
of housing rental prices and space, due to improvements in trip accessibility. The change in 
the urban spatial structure in turn affected the value of the investment project through a 
change in the travel demand pattern. The effects of transit technology investment projects on 
households’ residential location choices and housing market should therefore be explicitly 
considered. 
 
In view of the above, this paper addresses transit technology investment and selection issues 
under urban population volatility based on the RO approach. These issues include which 
transit technology should be invested in and when. The main contributions of this paper are as 
follows. First, an RO model is proposed to investigate the transit technology selection and 
investment timing problems. In the proposed model, the effects of population uncertainty and 
transit technology investment on the urban spatial structure are considered in terms of 
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households’ residential location choices and housing market. A comparison between the 
solutions of the models with and without considering urban spatial/land use equilibrium is 
made. Second, the trigger population thresholds for investing in a transit technology project 
and for shifting from a transit technology to another are analytically explored and compared. 
Third, comparative static analyses of the urban system and the transit technology investment 
decision are conducted. Sensitivity analyses are also carried out to assess the effects of key 
model parameters, such as the household income level, population volatility, project 
construction duration and discount rate, on timely investment decisions about urban transit 
technology projects. In addition, the loss in project value due to adoption of NPV valuation 
method but not RO valuation method is also estimated. The results show that transit 
technology investment can change urban spatial structure, and ignoring the effects of transit 
technology investment on urban spatial equilibrium can cause a late investment. In addition, 
there is a big difference in the trigger population thresholds for the transit technology 
selection estimated by the NPV and RO valuation approaches. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, housing market 
equilibrium with transit technology investment is described. Section 3 presents the RO model 
for transit technology selection and investment timing decisions. In Section 4, two examples 
are used to illustrate the applications of the proposed model. Finally, the conclusions are 
given in Section 5, together with recommendations for further studies. 
 
2. Housing market equilibrium 
 
In this paper, we assume that a transit investment project consists of three stages (represented 
by i): before project investment (i.e., before the project exists), during project construction, 
and after project operations. For presentation purpose, these three stages are indexed by the 
subscripts 0, 1, and 2, respectively. The public transit modes adopted at stages 0 and 1 are 
conventional/ordinary public transit modes (e.g., regular bus or minibus), and those at stage 2 
are mass public transit modes (e.g., metro, LRT or BRT). In this section, we formulate the 
housing market equilibrium problem in stage i. To facilitate the presentation of the essential 
ideas without loss of generality, basic model assumptions made in this paper are listed in 
Table 2. 
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2.1. Households’ residential location choices 
 
We first define the household utility function. Let x be the distance from a household’s 
residential location to the CBD, and iB  be the distance from the urban corridor boundary to 
the CBD (i.e., the city size) in stage i. A Cobb-Douglas utility function (e.g., see Beckmann, 
1969, 1974; Solow, 1972, 1973; Li et al., 2012a, 2013) is used: 
( ) ln ( ) ln ( ),   , 0, 1, [0, ], 0,1, 2i i i iU x z x g x x B i           ,  (1) 
where ( )iU x  is the utility of the households at location x in stage i; ( )iz x  is the 
consumption of non-housing goods at location x in stage i, of which the price is normalized to 
1; ( )ig x  is the consumption of housing at location x in stage i, measured in square meters of 
floor space; and   and   are positive constants. 
 
According to A4, each household within the city chooses a residential location that maximizes 
its utility subject to budget constraints. The household utility maximization problem can be 
expressed as 
,
max   ( ) ln ( ) ln ( )
i i
i i i
z g
U x z x g x   , (2) 
s.t. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),   [0, ], 0,1, 2i i i i i iz x p x g x Y x x B i      , (3) 
where ( )ip x  is the average annual rental price per unit of housing area at location x in stage 
i and iY  is the average annual household income in stage i. ( )i x  is the average annual 
travel cost from location x to the CBD in stage i and can be estimated by 
( ) 2 ( ),   [0, ], 0,1, 2i i ix C x x B i      , (4) 
where “2” denotes a round trip between the CBD and location x, and   is the average annual 
number of trips to the CBD by transit modes per household, based on the average number of 
daily trips,  , by transit modes per household (see A5). As an approximation and for 
illustration purpose, we use 365    in this paper. ( )iC x  is the (one-way) average travel 
cost from location x to the CBD. For simplicity, ( )iC x  is assumed to be a function of travel 
distance:  
( ) ,   0,1,2i i
i
xC x f i
V
     ,  (5) 
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where iV  is the average speed when traveling from location x to the CBD in stage i,   is 
the value of travel time, and if  is the transit fare (where 0 1 0f f  ). In this paper, we 
assume that conventional public transit modes (e.g., regular bus, minibus) are adopted at 
stages 0 and 1, whereas mass public transit modes (e.g., metro, LRT or BRT) are adopted at 
stage 2. In addition, the transit project construction may affect the vehicle travel speed due to 
a decrease in the capacity of transit services. Therefore, 1 0 2V V V   holds. The values of 
2V  and 2f  change with the type of transit vehicles. For example, among the metro, LRT 
and BRT, the metro has the fastest average speed, but the highest fare, whereas the BRT has 
the slowest average speed, but the lowest fare. The LRT has the middle values for both. 
 
From the first-order optimality conditions of the maximization problem (2)-(3), we obtain 
1
( )( ) (0) 1 ,   0,1, 2ii i
i
xp x p i
Y
      
, (6) 
( )( ) 1 ,   0,1, 2
(0)
i i
i
i i
Y xg x i
p Y
       
, and (7) 
 ( ) ( ) ,   0,1, 2i i iz x Y x i     , (8) 
where (0)ip  represents the average rental price of housing in the CBD area, which is 
determined below. Eqs. (6)-(8) define the equilibrium rental price per unit of housing area, the 
equilibrium amount of housing floor space per household, and the equilibrium consumption 
of non-housing goods at location x in stage i, respectively.  
 
Substituting Eqs. (6)-(8) into ( )iU x  in Eq. (1), we obtain the equilibrium household utility: 
 ln ln ,   0,1, 2
(0)
i
i i
i
YU Y i
p
        
. (9) 
Once (0)ip  is given, the terms on the right-hand side of Eq. (9) become constants. The 
households’ residential location choice equilibrium state is then reached: all of the households 
in the linear city have the same utility regardless of their residential locations and housing 
spaces. 
 
2.2. Housing production 
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We now examine the supply side of the housing market. Let ( )iS x  be the capital investment 
per unit of land area at location x in stage i, also called the capital investment intensity. It will 
serve as an indicator to describe the intensity of land development permitted in a particular 
area. According to A3, the property developers have the following Cobb-Douglas housing 
production function: 
( ( )) ( ( )) ,   0 1i ih S x S x
      , (10) 
where ( ( ))ih S x  is the housing supply per unit of land area at location x in stage i, and   
and   are positive parameters. 
 
Let ( )i x  be the net profit per unit of land area due to the housing supply at location x in 
stage i, expressed as 
( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ( ) ( )),   0,1, 2i i i i ix p x h S x r x kS x i      ,  (11) 
where ( )ir x  is the rent or value per unit of land area at location x in stage i and k is the price 
of the capital (i.e., the discount or interest rate). The rental price ( )ip x  per unit of housing 
floor area can be determined by Eq. (6). The first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (11) is the 
total revenue from housing rent. The final two terms are the land rent cost and capital cost, 
respectively. 
 
According to A3, each property developer in the housing market aims to maximize its net 
profit by determining the capital investment intensity, expressed as 
 ( )
max   ( ) ( )( ( )) ( ( ) ( ))
i
i i i i i
S x
x p x S x r x kS x     .  (12) 
The first-order optimality condition of maximization problem (12) yields 
 1( ) ( )( ( )) 0
( )
i
i i
i
x p x S x k
S x
     .  (13) 
Substituting Eq. (6) into (13) yields 
 
1 (1 )1
1 (1 )1 1 ( )( ) ( ) (0) 1 ,   0,1, 2ii i i
i
xS x p x k k p i
Y
              
.  (14) 
 
Let ( )in x  be the household residential density at location x in stage i. It is given by 
    ( ) ( )(1 )1 (1 ) 1( ( )) ( )1( ) (0) 1 ,   0,1,2( )i ii ii i ih S x xn x p k ig x Y Y
              
.  (15) 
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Under perfect competition, the property developers earn zero profit. Thus, 
( ) ( )( ( )) ( ),   0,1, 2i i i ir x p x S x kS x i
     . (16) 
Substituting Eqs. (6) and (14) into Eq. (16) yields 
 
1/(1 )1/
/(1 ) ( )1( ) 1 ( ) 1 (0) 1 ,   0,1, 2ii i i
i
xr x k S x p k i
Y

                       
. (17) 
 
Eqs. (14), (15), and (17) define the equilibrium capital investment intensity, household 
residential density, and land value at any location along a linear urban corridor in stage i, 
respectively. It is evident that given the values of (0)ip , iY ,  , and  , the capital 
investment intensity, household residential density, and land value decrease with an increase 
in either the travel cost or interest rate, and vice versa. 
 
2.3. Housing demand-supply equilibrium 
 
The equilibrium of the housing market must satisfy two conditions. First, all of the 
households fit exactly inside the urban corridor boundary, so that 
0
( )i
B
in x dx N , (18) 
where N is the total number of households in the city. 
 
Second, the equilibrium rent per unit of land area devoted to housing at the city’s edge equals 
the exogenous agricultural rent or the opportunity cost of the land according to A2: 
( )i i Ar B R , (19) 
where AR  is a constant agricultural rent. 
 
Note that there are two unknowns in Eqs. (18) and (19), (0)ip  and iB . We can determine 
their values by solving the two equations jointly. 
 
Proposition 1. Given the agricultural rent AR , the rental price of housing in the CBD area 
(0)ip  and the city boundary iB  in stage i are given by Eqs. (20) and (21), respectively: 
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1 (1 )1
1 2 2(0) 1 1 , 0,1, 2
1
iA
i
i A i
fRk Np i
Y R V
                             
, and (20) 
( 1)
21 1 ,   0,1, 2
2
i i
i i
A i
V Y NB f i
R V
                    
. (21) 
 
The proof of Proposition 1 is provided in Appendix A. According to Proposition 1, once the 
housing rental price in the CBD area (0)ip  and the city boundary iB  are obtained by Eqs. 
(20) and (21), the equilibrium rent per unit of housing space ( )ip x , the equilibrium amount 
of housing space ( )ig x , the equilibrium household utility iU , the equilibrium capital 
investment intensity ( )iS x , the equilibrium household residential density ( )in x , and the 
equilibrium land value ( )ir x  can be determined by Eqs. (6), (7), (9), (14), (15), and (17), 
respectively. 
 
Proposition 2 provides the comparative static results of the housing rental price in the CBD 
area (0)ip  and the city boundary iB . 
 
Proposition 2. Under the assumption 2 2AR V N  , the housing rental price in the city 
center (0)ip  increases with urban population size N  and transit fare if , but decreases 
with household income iY  and transit operating speed iV . The city boundary iB  increases 
with household income iY , urban population size N , and transit operating speed iV , but 
decreases with transit fare if . The effects of iY , N , iV , and if  on (0)ip  and iB  are 
summarized in Table 3. 
 
The proof of Proposition 2 is given in Appendix B. The assumption 2 2AR V N   generally 
holds because population size N is usually a large number, particularly in large Chinese cities. 
Proposition 2 can be explained as follows. (1) If the number of urban population increases, 
the demand for housing and thus the housing rental price in the city center increases. As a 
result, some inhabitants would like to move to the city suburbs to enjoy a larger housing space, 
and the city thus expands. (2) A rise in the transit fare means an increase in the annual 
household transportation expenses. Some households would thus like to live in the central 
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area of the city to reduce their transportation expenses. As a result, the city shrinks and the 
housing rental price in the city center increases. (3) If the household income level increases, 
households then have more budget for transportation. Some households would like to reside 
in the city suburbs and enjoy a larger housing space. Thus, the city expands and the housing 
rental price in the city center falls. (4) An increase in the transit operating speed means a 
decrease in travel time, leading some households to move to the city suburbs. Accordingly, 
the size of the city enlarges and the housing rental price in the city central area decreases. 
 
3. Model formulation 
 
3.1. Cost of transit project 
 
The annual project cost is incurred by the annual transit line facility cost and annual transit 
vehicle operating cost. The (annual) transit line facility cost is the sum of the fixed costs (e.g., 
the line overhead cost) and variable costs (e.g., the land acquisition, line construction, 
maintenance, and labor costs), proportional to the transit line length, i.e., 
0 1LC L    ,  (22) 
where 0  is the fixed cost, 1  is the variable cost per kilometer, and L  is the transit line 
length. For simplicity, the transit line length L  is assumed to equal the length of the city 
under the transit project operations, i.e., 
2L B ,  (23) 
where 2B  is determined by Eq. (21). 
 
The annual transit operating cost includes the fixed and variable operating costs, which are 
represented by 
0 1OC H
   ,  (24) 
where 0  is the fixed operating cost, 1  is the variable operating cost per vehicle, H is the 
transit headway,   is the average vehicle round journey time, and H  is the fleet size on 
the transit line.   can be calculated by 
2
2L
V
  ,  (25) 
 12
where 2V  is the average vehicle operating speed after the transit line is put into operation 
and 2L V  is the (one-way) average vehicle journey time. 
 
It should be pointed out that the parameters 0 , 1 , 0 , and 1  in Eqs. (22) and (24) 
depend on the type of transit vehicles. In general, the values of these parameters for a metro 
are larger than those for an LRT, which are in turn larger than those for a BRT. 
 
3.2. Transit technology investment timing problem 
 
The return on or benefit of a transit investment project is the improved accessibility of travel 
along the urban corridor to the CBD. The derived value from the transit investment project is 
uncertain due to the uncertainty in the urban population and thus travel demand. To describe 
the change in the urban population over time, we denote ( )N t  as the urban population size at 
time t. Suppose that the urban population size follows the geometric Brownian motion in 
terms of A4. ( )N t  then satisfies 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )dN t N t dt N t dw t   ,  (26) 
where   is the growth rate of the urban population,   is the volatility rate of the urban 
population, dt  is an infinitesimal time increment, and ( )dw t  is an increment of a standard 
Wiener process. For any given period t, ( )dw t  satisfies the equation ( ) tdw t t  , where 
t  is a random variable that follows the standard normal distribution with a mean of 0 and a 
standard deviation of 1. 
 
Transit infrastructure investment is irreversible due to the huge sunk cost. Studies showed that 
the traditional NPV method failed to accurately capture the economic value of investment in 
an uncertain and irreversible environment, whereas the RO approach provided a proper 
avenue for quantifying the value of management flexibility (McDonald and Siegel, 1986; 
Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; de Neufville, 2000). An RO refers to the right, but not the 
obligation, to undertake an action (e.g., deferring, expanding, contracting, or abandoning) at a 
predetermined cost (the exercise price) for a predetermined period (the life of the option). We 
use an RO approach to address the investment timing problem for a given transit technology 
when the urban population size fluctuates over time. 
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Determination of the optimal time for introducing a new transit technology is a standard 
stopping problem. In a low population density city, the passenger demand level is low. 
Waiting is thus a good strategy when the transit investment cost is high, implying that a 
“waiting region” is determined. However, in a high population density city, the passenger 
demand level is high and immediate investment may be a good decision. Accordingly, a 
“stopping region” is determined. The transit technology investment timing issue aims to 
determine the population threshold *N  that separates the waiting region from the stopping 
region. When the urban population size ( )N t  at time t exceeds the population threshold *N  
(i.e., *( )N t N ), the transit investment project should be introduced, otherwise it should be 
deferred. 
 
By the definition of the population threshold *N , the authority has no preference between the 
two assets (i.e., no investment or immediate investment) at *N . That is, at *N , the values of 
continuing to wait and immediate investment are equal. We assume that the transit investment 
project is based on the authority’s perspective of expected social welfare maximization (see 
A1 and A3). The value of continuing to wait is the sum of the expected discounted social 
welfare without the transit project and the option value of waiting to invest in the transit 
project. The value of making the investment immediately is the total expected discounted 
social welfare with the transit investment project, which is the sum of the expected discounted 
social welfare during the project construction and during the project operation. Let ( )F N  
denote the value of the option of investing in the transit project at population size N. Let 
0 ( )SW N  be the expected discounted social welfare without the transit investment project. Let 
1( )SW N  and 2( )SW N  be the expected discounted social welfare during the project 
construction and operation, respectively. At the population threshold *N , we have 
* * * *
0 1 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( )F N SW N SW N SW N   .  (27) 
Eq. (27) is the value-matching condition. At *N , the expected discounted social welfare 
without the transit project plus the value of the investment opportunity equals the expected 
discounted social welfare with the transit project. 
 
We now define the expected discounted social welfare at each investment stage, 0 ( )SW N , 
1( )SW N , and 2( )SW N , as follows. The expected discounted social welfare is the sum of the 
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expected discounted consumer surplus and the expected discounted producer surplus (i.e., the 
expected net profit of the transit investment). When there is no new transit technology 
investment project, the expected discounted social welfare equals the expected discounted 
consumer surplus, which depends on the resulting household utility 0 ( ( ))U N t . 0 ( )SW N  can 
thus be expressed as 
0 00
( ) ( ( )) ( ) ktNSW N E U N t N t e dt
      ,  (28) 
where [ ]NE   is the expectation operator with regard to the population size N,   is a 
parameter used to convert the household utility into equivalent monetary units, k is the 
riskless interest rate and is assumed to be a known constant across time, and 0( ( ))U N t  is the 
household utility or consumer surplus without the transit investment project, which can be 
calculated by Eq. (9). 
 
Under the immediate investment strategy, the transit technology investment project includes 
construction and operation stages. When the transit investment project is under construction, 
the resultant expected discounted social welfare 1( )SW N  equals the corresponding expected 
discounted consumer surplus minus the expected discounted transit line facility cost, 
represented by 
1 10 0
( ) ( ( )) ( ) kt ktN LSW N E U N t N t e dt C e dt
         ,  (29) 
where   is the construction duration of the transit project, which is assumed to be a constant 
in this paper, and the transit line facility cost LC  can be determined by Eq. (22). The transit 
operating cost is not included in Eq. (29) because the transit facilities are still under 
construction and thus are not in operation. 
 
When the transit technology investment project is in operation (i.e., interval [ , )  ), the 
expected discounted social welfare 2( )SW N  is the difference between the corresponding 
expected discounted consumer surplus minus the expected discounted transit operating cost: 
2 2( ) ( ( )) ( )
kt kt
N OSW N E U N t N t e dt C e dt
  
 
       ,  (30) 
where the transit operating cost OC  can be determined by Eq. (24). 
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Substituting Eqs. (28)-(30) into Eq. (27) and carrying out algebraic operations, we obtain 
* *( ) ( )F N N  ,  (31) 
where ( )N  is given by 
    1 0 2 10 0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )kt kt ktN O LN E U U N t e dt U U N t C e dt C e dt                      . (32) 
It should be noted that ( )N  represents the change in the expected discounted social 
welfare due to the introduction of the transit investment project, also called the investment 
return/benefit or project value in this paper. Under the mild assumption that 2 2AR V N  , 
we can derive the analytical expression for ( )N  as below. The proof is provided in 
Appendix C. 
 
Proposition 3. Suppose that 2 2AR V N   holds, the value of the transit investment project 
can then be determined by 
( )
1 2 2
0 1 2
2( ) (1 ) ln (1 ) ln ln 1
kV V fN NeN
k V V Y k
                             
 (1 ) kk OL C eC e
k k
    . (33) 
 
According to the RO theory (e.g., see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994), the expected return (or value) 
of the investment opportunity at equilibrium equals its expected rate of capital appreciation 
over the short time dt . This equilibrium condition can be expressed as 
   ( ) ( )tkF N t dt E dF N t    .  (34) 
Eq. (34) actually represents the Bellman equation for the option value  ( )F N t . Applying 
Ito’s lemma (e.g., see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994), we can determine the population threshold, 
*N , for introducing a new transit project and the option value function  ( )F N t  as follows. 
 
Proposition 4. Under the assumption 2 2AR V N  , the trigger population threshold *N  
and the option value function  ( )F N t  are, respectively, given by 
   
 
1*
( )1 2 2
1
0 1 2
1
21 (1 ) ln (1 ) ln ln 1
k k
L O
k
b k C e C e
N
V V fk b e
V V Y
   
 
                                    
, (35) 
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    11( ) ( ) bF N t a N t , (36) 
where 
 
  
11
2
1 2 2 2
1
1( )1 2 2
1
1 0 1 2
1 1 2 ,
2 2
12(1 ) ln (1 ) ln ln 1 .
1
bb
k
k k
L O
kb
k bV V fa e
b k V V Y C e C e

 
   
                                                             
 (37) 
 
The proof of Proposition 4 is provided in Appendix D. We carry out a comparative static 
analysis of the population threshold *N  and obtain the following results. 
 
Proposition 5. *N  is positively correlated with the urban population volatility rate  , the 
marginal capital cost of the transit line 1 , and the marginal operating cost of the transit line 
1 , i.e., 
*
0N  , 
*
1
0N  , and 
*
1
0N  . When the marginal capital cost of the transit line 
is larger than its marginal operating cost (i.e., L OC C ), *N  is positively correlated with 
the transit project construction duration  , i.e., 
*
0N  . 
 
The proof of Proposition 5 is given in Appendix E. It should be pointed out that the signs of 
*N  with regard to the household income level and the discount rate (i.e., 
*
i
N
Y

  and 
*N
k

 ) 
are difficult to determine analytically. A simulation method is therefore used to ascertain their 
relationships in the later numerical example. 
 
For comparison purpose, we derive the population threshold of the traditional NPV model as 
follows. In the NPV approach, a transit project is introduced if and only if the expected 
discounted social welfare with the transit project just exceeds that without the project, i.e., 
* * *
1 NPV 2 NPV 0 NPV( ) ( ) ( )SW N SW N SW N  .  (38) 
From Eq. (38), the population threshold in the NPV approach is obtained as below: 
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   *
NPV
( )1 2 2
0 1 2
1
2(1 ) ln (1 ) ln ln 1
k k
L O
k
k C e C e
N
V V fk e
V V Y
   
 
                                   
.  (39) 
Given the model parameters, from Eqs. (35) and (39), we can obtain the relationship between 
the population thresholds under the RO and NPV approaches as follows: 
* *1
NPV
1 1
bN N
b
  .  (40) 
Eq. (40) implies that the population threshold under the RO approach is always larger than 
that under the NPV approach, as the RO approach incorporates the value of flexibility through 
the option to wait and defer investment. 
 
3.3. Transit technology selection problem 
 
As assumed in A1, the authority or government makes transit investment decisions in a 
sequential way, i.e., first deciding which transit technology to choose, and then when to invest. 
Accordingly, once a transit technology is chosen, the optimal timing (i.e., the trigger 
population threshold) for a transit technology investment can then be determined by using the 
method developed in Section 3.2. In this section, we address the transit technology selection 
problem: given multiple transit technology options, which transit technology is the most 
appropriate to invest in. 
 
Let us consider multiple alternative transit technologies, such as the metro, LRT, and BRT, 
which are undergoing rapid developments and applications in some large Chinese cities. For a 
given urban population size, different transit technologies can bring different investment 
returns. Following A3, the authority will choose to introduce the transit technology that yields 
the highest return on the investment. Let M be the set of alternative transit technologies and 
1m  and 2m  be two transit technology options, where 1 2,m m M . Let  1m N  and 
 
2m N  be the investment benefits of transit technologies 1m  and 2m  under population 
size N , respectively. The definition of ( )   is applicable to different investment valuation 
methods. Specifically, “ ( ) ( )F    ” (see Eq. (36)) implies that an RO valuation method is 
used, and “ ( ) ( )     ” (see Eq. (33)) implies that the NPV method is used. For presentation 
purpose, we introduce two definitions. 
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Definition 1 (A dominant transit technology). Transit technology 1m  is dominant over 
technology 2m  in the region [ , ]
L UN N
 
if the transit investment benefit function satisfies 
   1 2 ,   [ , ]L Um mN N N N N  , (41) 
where LN  and UN
 
are the lower and upper bounds of the dominant region, respectively. 
When [ , ]L UN N  is the real number field, it is called wholly dominant. 
 
Definition 2 (Trigger population threshold for transit technology shift). The population size 
N  is at the critical (or trigger) level for shifting from transit technology 2m  to 1m  if and 
only if Inequality (41) becomes binding at N , i.e., 
   1 2m mN N  . (42) 
 
The following proposition further reveals the difference of the NPV and RO valuation 
approaches from the perspective of the transit technology shift. 
 
Proposition 6. (i) Under the NPV approach, there is a critical population size NPVN  for 
transit technology shift from 2m  to 1m , expressed as 
       1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
1 1 2 2
1 2( ) ( )2 2 2 2
1 2 1 2
1 1
2 2(1 ) ln ln 1 (1 ) ln ln 1
m m m m
m m
k k k km m m m
L O L O
NPV m m m m
k k
k C e C e C e C e
N
V f V fk e e
V Y V Y
       
   
                                                      
. (43) 
 
(ii) Under the RO approach, a transit technology is wholly dominant over the other transit 
technology in terms of the option value. Specifically, transit technology 1m  (e.g., metro) 
wholly dominates technology 2m  (e.g., LRT) when Inequality (44) holds, and vice versa. 
 
 
1 1
1
1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2
2
( )1 2 2
0 1 2
( )1 2 2
0 1 2
2(1 ) ln (1 ) ln ln 1 1
2 1(1 ) ln (1 ) ln ln 1
m
m m
m m
m
m m
k
k km m
L O
k km m m m
k L O
V V f e C e C eV V Y
V V f C e C ee
V V Y
 
   
   
 
                                                         
1
1
1b
b

 .  (44) 
 
Proof. Property (i) with the NPV approach can directly be derived by substituting Eq. (33) 
into Eq. (42). For Property (ii), when Inequality (44) holds, we can obtain 1 21 1
m ma a  by Eq. 
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(37), and thus    
1 2m m
F N F N  for any N  by Eq. (36). According to Definition 1, 1m  
wholly dominates 2m . This completes the proof of this proposition. 
 
Proposition 6 shows that given transit technologies 1m  and 2m , for the NPV model, when 
the population size reaches the critical level of NPVN , then the transit technology to be 
adopted should shift from 2m  to 1m . However, for the RO model, as long as Inequality (44) 
is satisfied (this is usually the case), transit technology 1m  is wholly dominant over transit 
technology 2m . 
 
Remark. It can be seen in Eq. (43) that the critical population size NPVN  relies on such 
parameters as transit vehicle operating speed 2V , transit fare 2f , construction duration of 
transit line  , transit line facility cost LC  and transit operating cost OC . These parameters 
describe the intrinsic characteristics of a transit technology and their values may change with 
the type of transit technologies. Among these parameters, 2V , 2f , and OC  are relatively 
stable. However, LC  and   may be significantly affected by the urban environment and 
site condition in terms of hydro-geological characteristics, and are thus sensitive and varied 
considerably, particularly for the metro technology. It can easily be shown by Eq. (43) that 
when L OC C  holds for transit technology m, the critical population size NPVN  with the 
NPV approach satisfies 
1
0NPVm
L
N
C
  , 
1
0NPV
m
N  , 2 0
NPV
m
L
N
C
  , and 
2
0NPV
m
N  . (45) 
Eq. (45) means that NPVN  increases with the increase in the values of 1
m
LC  and 1m  of 
transit technology 1m , but decreases with the increase in the values of 2
m
LC  and 2m  of 
transit technology 2m . 
 
Note that *N  in Eq. (35) or (39) presents the population threshold for introducing a transit 
technology. N  in Eq. (43) defines the trigger population threshold for shifting from one 
transit technology to another under the NPV approach. The value of N
 
may differ from that 
of *N . We thus have the following definition: 
 20
 
Definition 3. The trigger population threshold **N  for selecting a transit technology from 
multiple options is defined as the maximum of the population threshold of that transit 
technology itself *N  and the critical population threshold for transit technology shift N , 
i.e., 
 ** *max ,N N N . (46) 
 
Once the population size of a city reaches the trigger population size **N , the new transit 
technology can then be launched. It should be pointed out that according to Proposition 6(ii) 
and Eq. (46), under the RO approach, the value of **N
 
is equal to that of *N . However, 
both
 
may not be equal under the NPV approach. 
 
4. Model applications 
 
In this section, two test examples are used to illustrate the applications of the proposed model 
and the contributions of this study. The first example is intended to reveal the difference in 
the transit technology investment decisions with and without urban spatial or land use 
equilibrium consideration. The case without considering the land use equilibrium implies that 
the urban spatial structure in terms of urban residential distribution, housing rental price and 
space, and urban size is the same as that before transit technology investment. The effects of a 
transit technology investment on the urban spatial structure and the effects of the key model 
parameters (e.g., the project construction duration, discount rate, household income level, and 
population volatility) on the trigger population threshold for a transit technology investment 
are also investigated. The second example illustrates the real application of the proposed 
model in two candidate Chinese cities. 
 
In the following analysis, unless specifically stated otherwise, the input parameters and 
baseline values used in the model are the same as those shown in Table 4. Three types of 
transit technologies, the BRT, LRT, and metro, are considered. The input parameters for these 
technologies are given in Table 5. 
 
4.1. Example 1: Illustration of model properties 
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4.1.1. Comparison of investment decisions with and without land use integration 
 
Figs. 1a and b depict the option value curves (in bold line) and the NPV curves (in dotted line) 
under different transit technology investments with and without incorporating the land use 
equilibrium, which can be calculated by Eqs. (36) and (33), respectively. In Figs. 1a and b, the 
intersection point (D or D ) between the option value curve and the NPV curve for a given 
transit technology represents the population threshold *N  of the corresponding transit 
technology under the RO approach in terms of Eq. (31). The intersection point (G or G ) 
between the NPV curve and the horizontal line represents the population threshold *NPVN  
under the NPV approach according to Eq. (39). The intersection point (X or X ) between the 
NPV curves of different transit technologies represents the critical population size NPVN  for 
transit technology shift by Eq. (43). The trigger population threshold **N  for transit 
technology selection from multiple options is determined by Eq. (46). The population 
threshold solutions with and without the land use equilibrium consideration under the RO and 
NPV approaches are shown in Table 6. 
 
Some main insights in Figs. 1a and b and Table 6 are summarized as follows. First, the option 
value curve of the metro is above that of the LRT, which is above that of the BRT. This 
means that a costlier technology has a higher option value. Specifically, the option value of 
the metro is the highest, and that of the BRT is the lowest, and that of the LRT is in between. 
That is, the metro wholly dominates the LRT and the BRT, and the LRT wholly dominates 
the BRT in terms of the option value, which is consistent with that in Proposition 6(ii). This 
result favors prior introduction of a costlier technology from the perspective of the option 
value. As a result, a long wait for investment is needed such that the urban population size 
grows to the level of the trigger population threshold. In reality, the public cannot see such an 
option value that will be realized at a future time, and want their tax money to benefit them 
now as opposed to the future. Therefore, from the public perspective, an “effective” discount 
rate, which may be much higher than the real discount rate, can be used in a real application. 
Second, ignoring the effects of the transit technology investment on the land use or urban 
spatial equilibrium will lead to a late investment due to an underestimation of the investment 
benefits or returns. We take the RO solution as an example. With the land use equilibrium 
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consideration, the trigger population thresholds *N  for the metro, LRT, and BRT are 8.20, 
6.20, and 4.39 million people, associated with points 3D , 2D , and 1D  in Fig. 1a, 
respectively. The corresponding values of *N  without the land use equilibrium are 9.50, 
6.50, 4.70 million people, which are points 3D , 2D , and 1D  in Fig. 1b, respectively. 
Similar results can be observed for the NPV solution. Third, under the NPV approach, the 
population threshold solutions for a single transit technology ( *N ) and for selecting between 
multiple transit technology options ( **N ) are different. For example, for the case with land 
use equilibrium consideration, the NPV solutions *N  for the metro and LRT are 5.70 and 
4.31 million people (i.e., points 3G  and 2G  in Fig. 1a), respectively. However, the 
corresponding values of **N  are 6.38 and 4.85 million people (i.e., points 3X  and 2X  in 
Fig. 1a), respectively. This result also holds for the case without the land use equilibrium 
consideration (see Fig. 1b). Fourth, for a given transit technology, the RO approach leads to a 
higher population threshold *N  than the NPV approach, which satisfies Eq. (40). For 
example, with the land use equilibrium consideration, the population thresholds *N  for the 
metro under the RO and NPV approaches are 8.20 and 5.70 million, for the LRT are 6.20 and 
4.31 million, and for the BRT are 4.39 and 3.05 million people, respectively. The NPV 
approach therefore leads to a premature transit investment decision, which further illustrates 
the result underlying Eq. (40). 
 
4.1.2. Effects of transit technology investment project on the urban structure 
 
Figs. 2a-d display the profiles of the equilibrium household residential density, equilibrium 
housing rental price, equilibrium housing space per household, and equilibrium capital 
investment intensity, respectively, for an urban population size of 8.2 million people, which is 
the RO population threshold for introducing the metro technology (see Fig. 1a or Table 6). Fig. 
2a shows that in contrast with the “doing nothing” scenario (no new transit technology is 
introduced), introducing a transit technology can cause urban expansion or growth due to the 
increased accessibility and convenience to the city center. Introducing a metro, LRT, or BRT 
causes the city to grow by 15.6 km, 10.3 km, or 6.3 km, respectively, as shown in Table 7. 
The residential density in the urban central area then decreases, whereas that in the city’s 
outskirts increases, compared with the “doing nothing” scenario. The housing rental prices 
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and capital investment intensity in the suburbs then increase, whereas those in the urban 
central area decrease, as shown in Figs. 2b and d. As a result of the residential density 
decrease in the urban central area and the capital investment intensity increase in the suburbs, 
the housing spaces per household in the urban central area and in the suburbs increase, as 
shown in Fig. 2c. 
 
Table 7 further summarizes the effects of introducing a transit technology on the equilibrium 
solution of the urban system when the urban population size is fixed as 8.2 million people. It 
shows that introducing a transit technology can lead to a decrease in the average urban 
residential density, average housing rental price, average land value, and average capital 
investment intensity, but an increase in the average housing space. Of the three technologies, 
the effects of the metro on the urban system are the greatest, those of the LRT are the second 
greatest, and those of the BRT are the smallest. Specifically, the introduction of the metro, 
LRT, or BRT leads to a decrease in the average urban residential density of 238, 144, or 68 
households per square meter, in the average housing rental price of RMB1092, RMB542, or 
RMB120 per square meter, in the average land value of RMB165, RMB101, or RMB29 per 
square meter, and in the average capital investment intensity of RMB29.3, RMB22.1 or 
RMB10.0 million per square kilometer, but an increase in the average housing space per 
household of 10, 8, or 5 square meter per household, respectively. 
 
4.1.3. Effects of the metro project construction duration and discount rate on the population 
threshold 
 
In reality, a metro project construction duration is closely related to the urban geological 
conditions, whereas the duration of an LRT or BRT project construction is relatively stable. 
Fig. 3 shows the effects of the metro project construction duration and the discount (or 
interest) rate on the trigger population threshold. For a given discount rate, the longer the 
metro project construction duration, the higher the population threshold, and vice versa. A 
long construction duration implies a high investment opportunity cost, which reduces the 
attraction of the investment project. Accordingly, it would be better to postpone the 
investment and wait for the project value to increase with the population growth. On the 
contrary, for a given metro project construction duration, as the discount rate increases, the 
population threshold decreases, and vice versa, because a high discount rate means a high 
project investment cost. Therefore, a wise decision is to invest early at a low discount rate to 
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reduce the investment cost. 
 
4.1.4. Effects of the household income and population volatility on the population threshold 
 
Fig. 4 plots the change of the population threshold as the household income level and urban 
population volatility change. It shows that for a given population volatility, the trigger 
population threshold decreases with an increase in the household income level. A growth in 
the household income level implies an increase in the budget for transportation and housing 
consumption, according to Eq. (3). Some inhabitants would therefore like to live in the city 
suburbs and enjoy a larger housing space. A mass rapid transit mode should thus be 
introduced earlier to satisfy the inhabitants’ needs, leading to a decreasing population 
threshold. In contrast, for a fixed household income level, as the population volatility 
increases, the trigger population threshold also increases. This is because an increase in the 
urban population volatility means an increase in the flexibility (or option) value of the transit 
investment project (in fact, it is easy to show that *( ) 0F N    holds in terms of Eq. (36)). 
Deferring the investment is therefore a better strategy than immediate investment. 
 
4.2. Example 2: Case studies of two cities in China 
 
For further illustration purpose, we apply the proposed transit technology investment model to 
two candidate Chinese cities: Dalian and Changzhou. Dalian is a medium-density city located 
in Liaoning province, northeastern China. Changzhou is a low-density city located in Jiangsu 
province, eastern China. Table 8 shows the numbers of residents (which is the sum of the 
registered permanent residents and the migrant residents) and the per capita income levels of 
the two candidate cities between 1994 and 2014, according to the China Statistical Yearbooks 
(NBSC, 1994-2014). The associated annual growth rates of the population sizes and the per 
capita income levels for these two cities are also shown in Table 8, together with the volatility 
rates of the population sizes. In order to apply the households’ residential location choice 
model that is proposed in Section 2, the population size and the per capita income level in 
Table 8 need to be converted to a household level from a personal level. To do so, we assume 
in this example that each household has three persons (i.e., parents and one child) in terms of 
the China’s one-child policy, and each household makes an average of 3.0 trips to the CBD by 
transit modes per day, i.e., 3.0  . We also assume that since 2014, the change in the 
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population size over time follows a geometric Brownian motion and the per capita income 
level grows at the current average annual growth rate (see Table 8). Without loss of generality, 
we generate three trajectories (or paths) of the urban population size over time for each of the 
two cities according to the geometric Brownian motion, as indicated on the right-hand side of 
Fig. 5. The change trajectory of the per capita income level over time (based on the current 
average annual growth rate) for each city is shown on the right-hand side of Fig. 6. 
 
Figs. 7a and b show the change curves of the annual option value and annual NPV when 
different transit technologies are, respectively, introduced into Dalian and Changzhou and the 
changes in the future population sizes of these two cities follow the simulated population 
trajectory 1 (see Fig. 5). Fig. 7a shows that the option value and NPV curves for the LRT 
intersect at point Q1, which is associated with an investment in 2007 and yields a project 
value of RMB7.31 billion. The option value and NPV curves for the metro intersect at point 
Q2 with an investment in 2015, yielding a project value of RMB17.32 billion. Points Q1 and 
Q2 are the results estimated with the RO approach in terms of Eq. (35). Fig. 7a also shows 
that the NPV curves for the LRT and metro intersect with the horizontal axis at points Q3 and 
Q4, respectively, which are the results estimated with the NPV approach. Their corresponding 
investment timings are 1997 and 2001, respectively. Similarly, Fig. 7b shows that the optimal 
investment decisions generated with the RO approach for the BRT, LRT, and metro occur at 
points W1, W2, and W3, with investments in 2003, 2009, and 2020 and project values of 
RMB2.98, RMB5.67, and RMB23.81 billion, respectively. The optimal investment timings 
generated with the NPV approach are 1997, 2001, and 2005, which are associated with points 
W4, W5, and W6, respectively. 
 
Table 9 summarizes the estimated transit technology investment timings with the RO and 
NPV approaches under the simulated population trajectory 1 for Dalian and Changzhou. It 
can be seen that the NPV approach induces earlier investments than the RO approach of 14 
and 10 years for the metro and LRT for Dalian, and of 15, 8, and 6 years for the metro, LRT, 
and BRT for Changzhou, respectively. 
 
In addition, from Figs. 7a and b, one can calculate the total project values accrued from the 
investment time estimated with the NPV approach to that with the RO approach for the two 
cities under the simulated population trajectory 1, as well as the corresponding loss in the 
project values if the investment occurs at the time estimated with the NPV approach but not 
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with the RO approach. According to Fig. 7a, for the metro investment project in Dalian, the 
total option value and the total NPV accrued from 2001 (i.e., the estimated investment time 
with the NPV approach) to 2015 (i.e., the estimated investment time with the RO approach) 
are, respectively, the areas of 2 2 4 4Q Q Q Q   and 2 2 4Q Q Q , causing a loss in the project value 
equal to the area of 2 4 4Q Q Q . If Dalian invests in an LRT project in 1997 but not 2007, a loss 
in the project value equal to the area of 1 3 3Q Q Q  is then incurred. Similarly, the investment 
timing decisions about metro, LRT and BRT projects in Changzhou under the NPV approach 
can, respectively, lead to losses in the project values equal to the areas of 3 6 6W W W  , 2 5 5W W W  , 
and 1 4 4W W W  , compared with those under the RO approach. 
 
In the foregoing discussions, we have presented the solution of the transit technology 
investment decision problem under a specific population trajectory (i.e., trajectory 1). Note 
that different population trajectories could yield different investment value curves and thus 
different investment decisions for a given valuation approach (RO or NPV approach). 
Therefore, it is meaningful to calculate the average project value over the simulated 
population trajectories and the associated average loss for each city concerned, as shown in 
Table 10. It can be seen in this table that the average option value and the average NPV for 
the metro investment project in Dalian are, respectively, RMB151.76 billion and RMB107.13 
billion, causing an average loss of RMB44.63 billion. For the LRT investment project in 
Dalian, the NPV approach will incur an average loss of RMB19.11 billion compared to the 
RO approach. In addition, the investment decisions given by the NPV approach for metro, 
LRT and BRT projects in Changzhou can, respectively, yield average losses of RMB74.20 
billion, RMB11.87 billion, and RMB4.85 billion, in contrast to those given by the RO 
approach. These results further illustrate the bias of the NPV approach in determining timely 
investment decisions for transit technology. 
 
5. Conclusion and further studies 
 
In this paper, an RO model was proposed to address transit technology investment and 
selection problems with consideration of uncertainty in urban population size. The effects of a 
transit technology investment on the urban system in terms of households’ residential location 
choices and housing market were endogenously incorporated in the proposed model. The 
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properties of the proposed model were explored analytically, together with the trigger 
population thresholds for a transit technology investment and for shifting from a transit 
technology to another. The comparative static analyses of the urban system and the trigger 
threshold for a transit technology investment were also carried out. The transit project 
investment decisions with and without urban spatial equilibrium consideration were compared. 
The loss in the project value caused by bias in the NPV approach was also estimated. 
 
The proposed model offers some new insights and important findings. First, transit 
technology investment can change urban residential distribution and housing market and 
induce urban sprawl, thus leading to a decentralized city. Ignoring the effects of transit 
technology investment on land use or urban spatial structure could underestimate the 
investment return, thus resulting in a late investment of the transit technology. Second, there 
is a significant difference in the relationships among the investment benefit curves of different 
transit technologies estimated by the NPV and RO valuation approaches. For the NPV model, 
there is a trigger population threshold for shifting from a transit technology to another. 
However, for the RO model, one transit technology is always dominant over the other transit 
technology. Compared with the RO approach, the NPV approach underestimates the value of 
a transit technology investment project, causing a premature investment and thus a loss in the 
project value. Third, the optimal investment timing for a transit technology project is 
dependent of the type of transit technologies (e.g., BRT, LRT, or metro), project cost and 
construction duration, discount rate, urban population size, household income level, and 
population volatility. The investment decisions for single and multiple transit technologies 
may be different. The proposed modeling methodology can serve as a useful tool for making 
decisions about public transportation infrastructure investments and for evaluating the effects 
of transit project investment decisions and urban development policies on urban systems at a 
strategic level. We believe that the closed-form solution of the proposed model would be 
helpful for giving insightful findings in making decision for transit technology investment 
under different boundary conditions. 
 
Although the proposed model provides useful insights for transit infrastructure investment 
decisions and policy evaluation, some important extensions below could be made for further 
studies.  
 
(1) The correlation effect between alternative transit technologies was not explicitly 
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considered in the transit technology selection problem. A feasible approach to analyze such 
effect is to assume that the values of underlying transit technology investment projects are 
stochastic and evolve over time according to a stochastic process (see e.g., Geltner et al., 
1996). For example, we may consider two alternative transit technology investment projects 
1m  and 2m , with values that follow geometric Brownian motion: 
1 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),    ,j j j j j jd t t dt t dw t j m m       ,  
where ( )j t  is the value of investing in transit technology project j at time t. j  and j  
are the expected drift rate and the volatility rate of the value of transit investment project j, 
respectively. ( )jw t  is a standardized Wiener process. The correlation coefficient   of 
transit investment projects 1m  and 2m  satisfies 1 2[ ]m mE dw dw dt   and | | 1  . In line of 
this vein, we can explore the effect of correlation coefficient on transit technology investment 
decision-making for further study.  
 
(2) In this paper, the variation of population size is considered as the major source of 
uncertainty to affect the transit technology investment decisions. Other sources of uncertainty 
should also be studied, such as various random factors from the supply side (e.g., fluctuation 
in investment cost and/or interest rate) and demand side (e.g., attitudes of decision-makers, 
see Gao and Driouchi, 2013). These factors would have certain impacts on the returns or 
values of public transportation investment projects. It is thus of great importance to 
incorporate the investment risk due to other sources of uncertainty in the transit technology 
investment model. 
 
(3) The transit investment problems in this paper are only investigated for a single transit line 
in a transportation corridor. However, adding a transit line can usually cause re-distribution of 
traffic flows in a multi-modal transport network. It is, therefore, necessary to develop a 
network-based real option model to assess the effects of transit line investment with multiple 
technology options on the interrelated flows in a realistic network. In this regard, the studies 
of Chow and Regan (2011a,b), and Chow et al. (2011) provided an important basis for 
developing such a model for investigating the transit investment problems. 
 
(4) It was assumed in the proposed model that the government was the investor of transit 
projects with an objective of maximizing the expected social welfare. Recently, as investment 
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markets have been progressively deregulated in China, private sectors have been allowed to 
be involved in public infrastructure investment projects in various ways, such as 
Build-Operate-Transfer and Public-Private-Partnership. The objective of private investors is 
however to maximize their own net profit (Li et al., 2012b). It is thus worthwhile to extend 
the proposed model to consider the interests of the private and public investors under different 
transit market regulatory regimes. 
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1 
 
Substituting Eq. (15) into Eq. (18), we obtain 
0
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Combining Eqs. (17) and (19) yields 
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From Eqs. (4) and (5), we have 
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Substituting Eq. (A.3) into (A.2), we obtain 
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Substituting Eq. (A.4) into (A.1), we obtain 
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Substituting Eq. (A.5) into (A.4), we have 
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This completes the proof of Proposition 1. 
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Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2 
 
The partial derivatives of (0)ip  and iB  with regard to iY , N , iV , and if  are, 
respectively, as follows: 
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As 0 1    and 0 1    hold, we immediately obtain 
(0) 0i
i
p
Y
  , 
(0) 0ip
N
  , 
(0) 0i
i
p
V
  , 
(0) 0i
i
p
f
  .  (B.9) 
In addition, under the assumption of 2 2AR V N  , we have 
0i
i
B
Y
  , 0
iB
N
  , 0
i
i
B
V
  , 0
i
i
B
f
  .  (B.10) 
This completes the proof of Proposition 2. 
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Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 3 
 
We first derive the expressions for 1 0( ) ( )U U    and 2 1( ) ( )U U   . According to Eqs. (9) 
and (20), we have 
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p p
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.  (C.1) 
Suppose that the household’s income level is unchanged over time, i.e., 0 1 2Y Y Y  . Note 
that 0 0f   and 1 0f   hold because the transit project is not yet in operation. Substituting 
them into Eq. (C.1), we obtain 
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Similarly, 2 1( ) ( )U U    can be given by 
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When 2 2AR V N   holds, Eqs. (C.2) and (C.3) can, respectively, be expressed as 
  11 0
0
( ) ( ) 1 ln VU U
V
         
, and (C.4) 
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. (C.5) 
Substituting Eqs. (C.4) and (C.5) into Eq. (32) yields 
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0 0
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V
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As ( )N t  follows geometric Brownian motion (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994), we have 
0( )
tE N t N N Ne     .  (C.7) 
Substituting Eq. (C.7) into (C.6), we obtain 
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This completes the proof of Proposition 3. 
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Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 4 
 
By Ito’s lemma, we can obtain the solution of Eq. (34) as below 
    11( ) ( ) bF N t a N t . (D.1) 
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kb              and 1a  is a positive constant to be determined. 
 
From the value-matching condition in Eq. (31) as well as Eqs. (D.1) and (33), we obtain 
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By the smooth-pasting condition (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994), we have 
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Eq. (D.3) can be written as 
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where 
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.  (D.6) 
When 2 2AR V N   holds, the right-hand sides of Eqs. (D.5) and (D.6) approximate to 
zero. The final two terms of Eq. (D.4) then disappear. Solving the system of Eqs. (D.2) and 
(D.4), one obtains expression (35) for the population threshold *N . Then, one can further 
determine the parameter 1a  by Eq. (D.4), and thus expression (36) for the option value 
 ( )F N t  according to Eq. (D.1). This completes the proof of this proposition. 
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Appendix E: Proof of Proposition 5 
 
For ease of presentation, we denote 
1
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The partial derivatives of *N  with regard to  , 1 , 1 , and   are then given as follows: 
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Note that 0 1   , 1 1b  , 2 22Y f  , and k    hold. We thus obtain 
*
0N  , 
*
1
0N  , and 
*
1
0N  .  (E.6) 
The sign of 
*N
 depends on the sign of L OC C . As L OC C , we have 
*
0N  . (E.7) 
However, when L OC C , the sign of 
*N
  is ambiguous. This completes the proof of 
Proposition 5. 
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Table 1 Applications of real option theory to transportation infrastructure investment issues. 
Citation 
Type of 
transportation 
infrastructure 
Decision variables Objective function 
Considering effects 
of investment on 
land use or urban 
spatial structure 
Model solution Source of uncertainty 
Pichayapan et al. 
(2003) Expressway 
Immediate 
investment or defer 
to invest 
Max. expected net 
project benefit with 
binomial method 
No Simulation Traffic volume 
Zhao et al. (2004) A highway corridor 
Number of lanes, 
right-of-way width, 
rehabilitation or not 
Max. expected profit No Simulation 
Traffic demand, land 
price, and highway 
deterioration level 
Saphores and 
Boarnet (2006) 
A highway corridor 
or a transit line Investment timing 
Max. expected utility 
changes of residents 
before and after 
investment 
No Closed-form Urban population 
Friesz et al. (2008) Transportation network 
Flow distribution 
over time and space 
Max. expected net 
trip value No Simulation Trip (or asset) cost 
Galera and Solino 
(2010) A highway corridor Highway concession 
Max. expected cash 
flows or revenue No Closed-form Traffic volume  
Chow and Regan 
(2011a) 
Transportation 
network 
Link improvement 
timing 
Max. option value 
(including options to 
defer and re-design 
network) 
No Simulation Travel demand 
Chow and Regan 
(2011b) 
Transportation 
network 
Link improvement 
timing and capacity 
expansions 
Max. option value 
(including options to 
defer and re-order 
project) 
No Simulation Travel demand 
Gao and Driouchi 
(2013) A rail transit line Investment timing 
Alpha-maxmin. 
expected utility 
changes of residents 
before and after 
investment 
No Closed-form 
Urban population 
and decision-making 
uncertainty 
This paper A transit line 
Transit technology 
selection and 
investment timing 
Max. expected social 
welfare Yes Closed-form Urban population 
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Table 2 Basic model assumptions. 
No. of 
assumption Description 
A1 
We assume that the authority or government is the investor of transit project, and makes 
transit investment decisions in a sequential way. Specifically, it first decides which transit 
technology to choose, and then when to invest. The time horizon considered in this paper is 
infinite. The objective of transit technology investment is to maximize the expected social 
welfare of the urban system over the infinite time horizon. We also assume that the interest 
rate is riskless and is a known constant over the time horizon. In China, the current interest 
rate is around 6%. However, in other countries, it may range from 9% to 15% for 
infrastructure investment projects. 
A2 
The city studied is assumed to be linear, closed, and monocentric, implying that all job 
opportunities are located in the urban central business district (CBD). The value of land at 
or beyond the city boundary is equal to the agricultural rent or opportunity cost of the land. 
These assumptions have been widely adopted in the field of urban economics (see, for 
example, Alonso, 1964; Mills, 1972; Fujita, 1989; O’Sullivan, 2000; Kraus, 2006; Li et al., 
2013). 
A3 
The housing market contains the authority, property developer, and household agents. The 
authority aims to choose a transit technology and the investment timing to maximize the 
(expected) investment return or value of the transit project in terms of the expected social 
welfare. The property developers determine the intensity of their capital investment in the 
land market to maximize the net profit generated by the supply of housing. Each property 
developer is assumed to adopt a Cobb-Douglas housing production function (see, for 
example, Beckmann, 1974; Quigley, 1984; Li et al., 2013). 
A4 
All households in the city are assumed to be homogenous, implying that their income 
levels and utility functions are identical. Each household has a Cobb-Douglas utility 
function. A household’s income is spent on transportation, housing, and composite goods. 
The objective of each household is to maximize its utility by choosing a residential 
location, housing space size, and amount of other goods within its budget constraints (see, 
for example, Solow, 1972, 1973; Beckmann, 1969, 1974; Anas, 1982; Fujita, 1989). It is 
further assumed that the urban population size (represented by 0N  ) stochastically 
fluctuates over time and follows a geometric Brownian motion (see also Saphores and 
Boarnet, 2006; Gao and Driouchi, 2013). 
A5 
We assume that the average daily number of trips to the CBD by transit modes per 
household is  . For example, 1   indicates that each household makes an average of 
one trip to the CBD by transit modes per day. 
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Table 3 The effects of the model parameters on the housing rental price in the CBD area and 
the city boundary. 
 
 iY  N  iV  if  
(0)ip  - + - + 
iB  + + + - 
Note: “+” represents a positive correlation and “−” represents a negative correlation. 
 
 
Table 4 Input parameters for model application. 
 
Parameter Definition Baseline value 
Y Average annual household income (RMB/year) 80,000 
AR  Agricultural rent at the city boundary (RMB/ 2km /year) 100 
 ,   Parameters in the household utility function 0.75, 0.25 
 ,   Parameters in the housing production function 0.7, 0.05 
0V , 1V  
Average journey speed before and during project construction 
(km/h) 20, 18 
0f , 1f  Fare before and during project construction (RMB) 0, 0 
H Transit service headway (hour/vehicle) 0.1  
  Parameter in the social welfare function 6350 
  Annual population growth rate 1.1% 
  Population volatility rate 8.0% 
k Riskless interest rate 6.0% 
  Average daily number of trips to the CBD area per household 1.0 
Source: please refer to Li et al. (2012a), Saphores and Boarnet (2006), and Chen et al. (2015). 
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Table 5 Input parameters for the metro, LRT, and BRT technologies. 
 
Parameter Definition Metro LRT BRT 
2V  Average vehicle operating speed (km/h) 40 35 30 
2f  Transit fare (RMB) 4.0 3.0 2.0 
0  
Fixed component of the annual transit facility cost 
(million RMB/year) 
1.2 1.0 0.7 
1  
Variable component of the annual transit facility 
cost (million RMB/km/year) 
50.0 7.0 5.0 
0  
Fixed component of the annual transit operating 
cost (million RMB/year) 
1.2 0.5 0.35 
1  
Variable component of the annual transit 
operating cost (million RMB/vehicle/year) 
6.5 1.8 1.5 
  
Duration of the construction of the transit line 
(years) 
5 3 1 
Source: CPSITS (2011), BAOGAO (2012), and Li et al. (2012a). 
 
 
Table 6 Trigger population thresholds (million people) for different transit technology 
investments for the RO and NPV models with and without land use equilibrium. 
 
Transit 
technology 
Approach 
used 
With land use equilibrium Without land use equilibrium 
*N  
**N  *N  **N  
Metro RO 8.20 8.20 9.50 9.50 
NPV 5.70 6.38 6.60 7.35 
LRT RO 6.20 6.20 6.50 6.50 
NPV 4.31 4.85 4.50 4.95 
BRT RO 4.39 4.39 4.70 4.70 
NPV 3.05 3.05 3.20 3.20 
Note: *N  denotes the trigger population threshold for a single transit technology, and is given by Eq. (35). 
**N  denotes the trigger population threshold for selecting among multiple transit technology options, and 
is determined by Eq. (46). 
 
 43
Table 7 Equilibrium solutions of the urban system with different transit technology 
investments when the urban population size is fixed as 8.2 million people. 
 
Performance index Metro LRT BRT 
Doing 
nothing 
City length (km) 55.3 50.0 46.0 39.7 
Average urban residential 
density (households/ 2km ) 
682 776 852 920 
Average housing rental price 
(RMB/ 2m ) 
4550 5100 5522 5642 
Average housing space per 
household ( 2m /household) 
39 37 34 29 
Average land value (RMB/ 2m ) 776 840 912 941 
Average capital investment 
intensity (million RMB/ 2km ) 
166.9 174.1 186.2 196.2 
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Table 8 Population sizes and per capita income levels of two candidate cities between 1994 
and 2014. 
 
Year 
Population size (million people) Per capita income level (RMB/year/person) 
Dalian Changzhou Dalian Changzhou 
1994 5.039 3.310 3152 4123 
1995 5.295 3.390 3574 4532 
1996 5.350 3.510 4001 4847 
1997 5.566 3.550 4544 5322 
1998 5.690 3.704 5077 5633 
1999 5.770 3.770 5434 6192 
2000 5.890 3.795 6098 6392 
2001 5.966 3.855 6234 7205 
2002 5.984 3.902 6765 7833 
2003 5.992 3.923 7255 8705 
2004 6.015 4.023 8183 9851 
2005 6.020 4.110 11994 11379 
2006 6.060 4.257 13456 14356 
2007 6.080 4.352 15456 18765 
2008 6.130 4.407 17234 24092 
2009 6.170 4.452 19734 26723 
2010 6.690 4.593 21923 27455 
2011 6.740 4.650 24276 29559 
2012 6.850 4.687 27480 33587 
2013 6.954 4.692 29434 35232 
2014 6.966 4.723 30238 39483 
Average annual 
growth rate 1.65% 1.80% 12.27% 12.20% 
Population 
volatility rate  2.05% 1.16% – – 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (NBSC, 1994-2014). 
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Table 9 Estimated investment timings for two candidate cities under population trajectory 1. 
 
Transit technology Approach used 
Estimated investment timing (Year) 
Dalian Changzhou 
Metro RO 2015 2020 
NPV 2001 2005 
LRT RO 2007 2009 
NPV 1997 2001 
BRT RO – 2003 
NPV – 1997 
Note: The population size of Dalian city has exceeded 5.0 million since 1994 (see Table 8). A BRT cannot satisfy 
the needs of the urban development of Dalian city, and thus a BRT project is not considered. 
 
 
Table 10 Average project value over the simulated population trajectories for each candidate 
city. 
 
Transit 
technology 
Approach used 
Average project values (billion RMB) 
Dalian Changzhou 
Metro RO 151.76 192.87 
NPV 107.13 118.67 
Difference 44.63 74.20 
LRT RO 54.93 37.43 
NPV 35.82 25.56 
Difference 19.11 11.87 
BRT RO – 15.11 
NPV – 10.26 
Difference – 4.85 
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(a)                                     (b) 
Fig. 1. Option value curves (in bold line) and NPV curves (in dotted line) under different 
transit technology investments with and without land use equilibrium consideration. 
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(d) 
Fig. 2. (a)-(d) represent household residential density, housing rental price, housing space per 
household, and capital investment intensity for a given population size of 8.2 million people, 
respectively. 
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Fig. 3. Change of the population threshold with the discount rate and metro project 
construction duration. 
 
 
 
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140
Household income level (thousand RMB)
Po
pu
la
tio
n 
th
re
sh
ol
d 
(m
ill
io
n 
pe
op
le
)
 
 
Fig. 4. Change of the population threshold with the household income and population 
volatility. 
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Fig. 5. Actual and simulated population sizes of two candidate cities between 1994 and 2030. 
The population size after 2014 is simulated according to geometric Brownian motion. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Actual and forecasted annual per capita income levels of two candidate cities between 
1994 and 2030. The per capita income level after 2014 grows by a constant rate. 
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Fig. 7a. Option value and NPV of introducing a metro or LRT in Dalian under simulated 
population trajectory 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7b. Option value and NPV of introducing a metro, LRT, or BRT in Changzhou under 
simulated population trajectory 1. 
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